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THE LEGISLATIVE ABROGATION OF INTERSPOUSAL
IMMUNITY IN VIRGINIA
I. INTRODUCTION
Is a wife who hires someone to murder her husband liable in tort for
the injuries he sustains in the murder attempt? The Virginia Supreme
Court faced just this question in 1980 in Counts v. Counts.1 In light of the
partial abrogation of the doctrine of interspousal immunity by the Vir-
ginia Supreme Court during the 1970's in wrongful death actions2 and in
actions for damages in motor vehicle accident cases,3 a well reasoned pre-
diction would have anticipated a further erosion of the doctrine.4 In
Counts, however, the court disallowed the interspousal suit for an inten-
tional tort, signaling that it had no intention of making further judicial
exceptions to the doctrine of interspousal immunity. The General Assem-
bly then took the initiative and in its 1981 session completed the partial
abrogation begun by the courts by abolishing the defense of interspousalimmunity.5 With this action the legislature brought Virginia into line
with the growing trend toward abrogation. This article traces the doctrine
of interspousal immunity from its orgins in English common law, through
its partial abrogation by the Virginia court which ended with Counts, to
its abolition as a defense by the Virginia General Assembly in 1981.
11. THE HISTORY OF INTERSPOUSAL IMMUNITY IN VIRGINIA
A. The Common Law Origin
The doctrine of interspousal immunity is a product of the English com-
1. 221 Va. 151, 266 S.E.2d 895 (1980).
2. Korman v. Carpenter, 216 Va. 86, 216 S.E.2d 195 (1975).
3. Surratt v. Thompson, 212 Va. 191, 183 S.E.2d 200 (1971).
4. In fact the Roanoke County Circuit Court made an exception to interspousal immunity
in an intentional tort action on May 22, 1980. The jury awarded a $65,000 damage award to
a wife for injuries inflicted by her husband. The judge allowed this action to proceed on the
ground that interspousal immunity did not apply since the parties were divorced at the time
of the suit. This was reasonable in view of the trend in Virginia toward abrogation. After the
Virginia Supreme Court decision in Counts v. Counts, the judge granted a defense motion to
suspend the award. NAT'L L.J. June 30, 1980, at 5, col. 1.
5. The bill sponsored by Senator Wiley F. Mitchell, Jr., was introduced as Senate Bill No.
542. It was signed by Governor Dalton on March 21, 1981 and became effective July 1, 1981.
VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-220.1 (Cum. Supp. 1981) reads as follows: "The common-law de-
fense of interspousal immunity in tort is abolished and shall not constitute a valid defense
to any such cause of action arising on or after July one, nineteen hundred eighty-one."
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mon law, which regarded the personal and property rights of the wife as
merged with those of her husband.' As a result of this doctrine, a wife
could not sue or be sued without the joinder of her husband.7 Since the
husband would be both plaintiff and defendant in interspousal suits, this
unity theory constructed a procedural bar to such suits.8 Substantively
the wife was precluded from suing her husband in tort since she had no
personal right of action." Virginia followed this theory of legal unity early
in its history and disallowed suits between husband and wife.10
B. The Married Women's Act
The legal status of women began to change in the mid-nineteenth cen-
tury with the enactment in all jurisdictions of statutes known as Married
Women's Acts. These statutes destroyed the unity of the husband and
wife thereby allowing married women the separate control and ownership
of their property, and the capacity to sue or be sued in their own right.1
Virginia's Married Women's Act was enacted in 1877,12 and the first at-
6. "By marriage, the husband and wife are one person in law: that is, the very being or
legal existence of the women is suspended during the marriage, or at least is incorporated
and consolidated into that of the husband." 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARiES 442.
7. W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 122 (4th ed. 1971).
8. McCurdy, Torts Between Persons in Domestic Relation, 43 HAnv. L. REv. 1030, 1032-
33 (1930) [hereinafter cited as McCurdy, Torts]; McCurdy, Personal Injury Torts Between
Spouses, 4 VILL. L. Rav. 303 (1959) [hereinafter cited as McCurdy, Personal Injury Torts].
In the latter article, the author states:
[T]he combination of various incidents of marriage, some substantive, some procedu-
ral, some conceptual, made it impossible for one spouse ever to be held civilly liable
as a tortfeasor, in any situation, and without exception, to the other for any act, ante-
nuptial or during marriage, causing personal injury which would have been a tort but
for the marriage.
McCurdy, Personal Injury Torts at 307.
9. McCurdy, Personal Injury Torts, supra note 8, at 307.
10. See Paynes v. Coles, 15 Va. (1 Munf.) 373 (1810). But see DeBaun's Ex'r v. DeBaun,
119 Va. 85, 89 S.E. 239 (1916) (in a court of equity, suits were allowed between spouses).
11. W. PROSSER, supra note 7, at § 122.
12. 1876-77 Va. Acts, ch. 329. The current version of the Married Women's Act is at VA.
CODE ANN. §§ 55-35 to -37 (Repl. Vol. 1974). Section 55-35 reads in part:
A married woman shall have the right to acquire, hold, use, control and dispose of
property as if she were unmarried.... But neither her husband's right to curtesy
nor his marital rights shall entitle him to the possession or use, or to the rents, issues
and profits of such real estate duringthe coverture; nor shall the property of the wife
be subject to the debts or liabilities of the husband.
Section 55-36 provides in pertinent part: "A married woman may contract and be con-
tracted with and sue and be sued in the same manner and with the same consequences as if
she were unmarried. . . ." Section 55-37 provides: "A husband shall not be responsible for
any contract, liability or tort of his wife, whether the contract or liability was incurred or
the tort was committed before or after marriage."
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tacks on the doctrine of interspousal immunity involved an interpretation
of this Act.1 3 In Keister's Adm'r v. Keister's Ex'r, 4 the Virginia Supreme
Court faced for the first time the question of whether the statute had
changed the common law to allow a married woman a cause of action
against her husband for damages resulting from an assault committed
during the marriage. The court concluded that the legislature must be
presumed to have considered the existing common law when enacting the
statute and held that the common law would remain in effect since the
intent to change did not appear expressly or impliedly in the Act.1 5
Common law interspousal immunity remained intact with respect to
personal torts,16 but, as the Married Women's Acts undermined the com-
mon law unity theory, policy reasons became paramount in defending the
immunity doctrine. In a concurring opinion in Keister, Justice Burks ar-
ticulated these policy reasons for upholding interspousal immunity. Mar-
riage is "the most sacred relation known to society. ... Upon the pres-
ervation of its integrity the health, morals and purity of the State is [sic]
dependent."17 The justice also noted that there were sufficient alternative
remedies such as divorce suits or criminal prosecutions. s
The view of interspousal immunity in Keister was extended in Furey v.
Furey19 to cover a case in which a wife brought an action to recover dam-
ages for a tort committed by her husband before their marriage. The
court said that is was the common law rule that marriage extinguishes
13. In Alexander v. Alexander, 85 Va. 353, 7 S.E. 335 (1888) the court said the Married
Women's Act should not be construed to change the personal relations between spouses.
14. 123 Va. 157, 96 S.E. 315 (1918) (wrongful death action brought by the wife's adminis-
trator against the executors of the husband's estate).
15. Id., at 162, 96 S.E. at 317. The court in Keister followed the reasoning of Thompson v.
Thompson, 218 U.S. 611 (1910). In Thompson, the Court interpreted the Married Women's
Act of the District of Columbia as allowing the wife to maintain actions of tort in her own
name but not giving her a right of action against her husband. In determining the legislative
intent, the Court said that "such radical and far-reaching changes should only be wrought
by language so clear and plain as to be unmistakable evidence of the legislative intention."
218 U.S. at 618. This expresses the traditional view that statutes in derogation of the com-
mon law should be construed strictly.
16. In Keister, the court found that the legislature intended to enlarge the remedies of
married women only with respect to rights already existing at common law, not to create a
new cause of action. 123 Va. at 163, 96 S.E. at 317.
17. Id. at 176, 96 S.E. at 322 (Burks, J., concurring). Justice Burks supported the common
law unity of identity by maintaining that the duties of marriage "forbid the idea that this
'one flesh' may so divide itself that either spouse may sue the other." Id. at 177, 96 S.E. at
322. He also expressed concern that the court would become a forum for the public airing of
domestic difficulties.
18. Id. at 177, 96 S.E. at 322 (Burks, J., concurring).
19. 193 Va. 727, 71 S.E.2d 191 (1952).
19811
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liability for antenuptial torts.20 Although the court would not allow an
action for a purely personal tort, it later ruled in Vigilant Insurance Co.
v. Bennett,21 that a spouse is liable for tortious damage to the property of
the other spouse. The issue in Vigilant Insurance was whether the insur-
ance company, as subrogee of the husband, was entitled to maintain an
action against his wife for the destruction of his automobile. The court
construed sections 55-35 through -37 of the Virginia Code22 as abolishing
the marital unity in regard to property interests, and as imposing on the
wife full liability for torts on property.22
III. THE PARTIAL ABROGATION OF THE DOcTRINE OF INTERSPOUSAL
IMMUNITY IN VIRGINIA
Not until 1971 did the Virginia Supreme Court take the first step in
abrogating the doctrine of interspousal immunity. In Surratt v. Thomp-
son,24 the administrator of a deceased woman's estate brought a wrongful
death action against her husband for personal injuries sustained in an
automobile accident.25 In dismissing the common law unity theory, the
court declared that "nothing in the nature of the common law requires us
to adhere to an outmoded concept that a wife cannot so separate herself
from her husband's flesh as to be capable of maintaining an action
against him."2 The Surratt court cited and relied on Smith v. Kauff-
man,2, an automobile accident case decided the same day involving the
issue of parental immunity which rejected the policy justification that im-
munity was a preserver of family tranquility. The wide use of liability
insurance was credited with eliminating the threat to family harmony.2 s
20. Id. at 730, 71 S.E.2d at 192.
21. 197 Va. 216, 89 S.E.2d 69 (1955). The only rights which the insurance company had
were those that the husband had against his wife. See 42 VA. L. REv. 119 (1956).
22. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 55-35 to -37 (Repl. Vol. 1974).
23. 197 Va. at 226, 89 S.E.2d at 76. See Edmonds v. Edmonds, 139 Va. 652, 124 S.E. 415
(1924) (wife had right to bring action of forcible entry and detainer against husband).
24. 212 Va. 191, 183 S.E.2d 200 (1971). See 6 U. RICH. L. REv. 379 (1972).
25. 212 Va. at 192, 183 S.E.2d at 201.
26. Id. at 194, 183 S.E.2d at 202. The court construed the Virginia wrongful death statute
as affording the deceased wife's personal representative no right of action unless the right
existed immediately before her death. This interpretation forced the court to confront the
common law squarely and modify it to allow the right to sue. VA. CODE: ANN. § 8-633 (1957)
(currently codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-50 to -56 (1977 Repl. Vol & Cum. Supp. 1980)).
27. 212 Va. 181, 183 S.E.2d 190 (1971). The court in Smith abrogated the parental immu-
nity rule in motor vehicle accident cases. A seven-year-old child was allowed to sue the
administrator of her stepfather's estate for injuries incurred through the stepfather's
negligence.
28. Id. at 185, 183 S.E.2d at 194. "The very high incidence of liability insurance covering
Virginia-based motor vehicles, together with the mandatory uninsured motorist endorse-
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Since the recovery would be from the insurance company rather than
from the defendant spouse, the disruption of the home would be mini-
mized and the burden on the family finances eliminated.2 9 The mere pos-
sibility of fraud and collusion between the spouses was held to be too
flimsy a reason to deny redress for injury.30 The court in Surratt also
relied on Worrel v. Worrell,31 an early intra-family immunity case which
held that "former rules should give way to rules of reason in the light of
changed circumstances. s3 2 The court's weakening of both the common
law unity theory and the public policy reasoning for immunity thus al-
lowed the abrogation of interspousal immunity for personal injuries re-
sulting from motor vehicle accidents.33
Four years later the court made a second exception to the immunity
doctrine in Korman v. Carpenter," in which the administrator of an es-
tate brought a wrongful death action on behalf of the deceased's parents
and brothers against the husband's committee. In its decision, the court
noted the modern trend of abrogation across the country and the evolving
nature of the common law. 5 Although the old common law basis for the
doctrine was dismissed, the policy of fostering a harmonious marital rela-
tionship was still regarded as viable.38 However, the court found that the
ments to insurance policies, has made our rule of parental immunity anachronistic when
applied to automobile accident litigation." Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 182, 183 S.E.2d at 192.
31. 174 Va. 11, 4 S.E.2d 343 (1939). In Worrell, exception was created to the doctrine of
parental immunity allowing an action by a twenty-year-old college student injured in a colli-
sion between a truck and a commercial bus owned by her father.
32. 212 Va. at 193, 183 S.E.2d at 202 (citing Worrell v. Worrell, 174 Va. at 20, 4 S.E.2d at
346-47). See 21 WM. & MARy L. REv. 273 (1979).
33. The Surratt court cited two New Jersey cases in support of abrogation in automobile
accident cases: Immer v. Risko, 56 N.J. 482, 267 A.2d 481 (1970); State v. Culver, 23 N.J.
495, 129 A.2d 715 (1957).
34. 216 Va. 86, 216 S.E.2d 195 (1975). See also 10 U. RICH. L. Rsv. 434 (1976).
35. The court observed:
One of the great virtues of the common law is its dynamic nature that makes it
adaptable to the requirements of society at the time of its application in court. There
is not a rule of the common law in force today that has not evolved from some earlier
rule of common law, gradually in some instances, more suddenly in others, leaving the
common law of today when compared with the common law of centuries ago as differ-
ent as day is from night. The nature of the common law requires that each time a
rule of law is applied it be carefully scrutinized to make sure that the conditions and
needs of the times have not so changed as to make further application of it the in-
strument of injustice.
216 Va. at 90, 216 S.E.2d at 197-98 (quoting State v. Culver, 23 N.J. 495, 505, 129 A.2d 715,
721 (1957)).
36. 216 Va. at 90, 216 S.E.2d at 197.
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policy was not applicable in this case since the marriage was terminated
by the intentional killing of one spouse by the other. The court thus
carved another exception to the doctrine, carefully limited to situations in
which the tortious act "results in the termination of the marriage by
death, and when the deceased spouse is survived by no living child or
grandchild. '3
7
Surratt and Korman established a somewhat limited trend toward ab-
rogation of interspousal immunity on a case by case basis. The only ves-
tige of justification for immunity remaining following Surratt and Kor-
man was the policy of protecting family harmony. The time was ripe for
further abrogation of the doctrine in cases where the threat to marital
relations was minimal. The Virginia Supreme Court was presented with
this opportunity in Counts v. Counts.38
IV. THE EFFECT OF Counts v. Counts ON THE STATUS OF THE DOCTRINE
OF INTERSPOUSAL IMMUNITY IN VIRGINIA
A. Facts
Mr. Counts sued his former wife for compensatory and punitive dam-
ages, alleging injuries intentionally inflicted upon him by his wife's co-
conspirator in an unsuccessful murder-for-hire plot. While still married to
and living with her husband, Mrs. Counts had solicited Miles Turner to
kill Mr. Counts for $5,000. Turner attempted to carry out the conspiracy
to murder, but succeeded only in inflicting severe mental and physical
injuries on Mr. Counts. 9 The couple was subsequently divorced and Mr.
Counts commenced this tort action two weeks later. Mrs. Counts filed a
demurrer stating that the action was barred by the doctrine of inter-
spousal immunity. The trial court sustained the demurrer and dismissed
the action on the ground that "interspousal immunity was still the law in
Virginia."'' The Virginia Supreme Court upheld this dismissal.
37. Id. at 92, 216 S.E.2d at 198. The court narrowed this exception because of its concern
about the divisive effect on the family and the economic ramifications of allowing a recovery
on a wrongful death action from a surviving parent who is responsible for the care and
maintenance of persons for whose benefit the recovery is received.
38. 221 Va. 151, 266 S.E.2d 895 (1980).
39. Id. at 151, 266 S.E.2d at 895-96. Mrs. Counts was convicted of conspiring to mali-
ciously wound her husband. She was fined and sentenced to jail.
40. Id. at 153, 266 S.E.2d at 896. The trial judge recognized the exceptions in automobile
accident cases and the Korman exception, but held that any further exception must be
made by the Supreme Court of Virginia or the General Assembly. Id.
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B. Analysis
The Virginia Supreme Court was faced with the question of whether
one spouse, who directs the intentional infliction of harm on the other is
immune from tortious liability if the parties are divorced at the time the
action is brought. The plaintiff, in urging that the doctrine be abolished
or further modified, used Korman to illustrate the demise of both the
common law and the public policy justifications for immunity.41 In Kor-
man the policy of preservation of the marriage was found to be irrelevant
when one spouse murdered the other since there was no marriage to be
saved.42 Thus, Mr. Counts argued, since this action was brought after the
parties were divorced, there was similarly no marriage to be preserved. 43
The court responded to this contention by emphasizing that the prece-
dential scope of Korman was restricted to the actual facts of that case.
44
Despite the exception made in Korman, the court distinguished that case
and reaffirmed the immunity doctrine as a rule which protects and en-
courages the preservation of marriages.45 In Korman, the tortious act
which resulted in death actually terminated the marriage. The marriage
in Counts, however, remained intact after the tort and it was not until
the further act of divorce that the marriage was dissolved. The court rea-
soned that if they authorized these damage suits "the availability of such
a remedy and the accompanying prospect of a monetary award would
contribute to the disruption of many marriages."'46 The majority reiter-
41. Id. (citing Korman v. Carpenter, 216 Va. at 90, 216 S.E.2d at 198).
42. 216 Va. at 90, 216 S.E.2d at 198.
43. 221 Va. at 153-54, 266 S.E.2d at 896.
44. In Korman the court stated it was "not persuaded that permitting a living spouse to
sue for torts committed by one on the other, except in automobile accident litigation, would
do otherwise than contribute to the destruction of their marriage." 216 Va. at 92, 216 S.E.2d
at 198.
45. The Counts court characterized the immunity doctrine as a "concept which is in-
grained in the body of law of this State and which is an integral part of the public policy of
the Commonwealth to preserve the family unit." 221 Va. at 155, 266 S.E.2d at 897.
46. The court constructed the following scenario to illustrate the potential disruptive ef-
fect of such a remedy on marriage:
The formerly stable marriage of Husband and Wife begins to deteriorate. Finally,
in a particularly heated exchange, Husband intentionally strikes Wife causing an in-
jury. Wife then leaves the marital abode and retains an attorney. During the initial
consultation, the attorney concludes that Wife is entitled to a divorce on the ground
of cruelty and constructive desertion, but nevertheless properly explores the possibil-
ity of a reconciliation. Having learned of the injury, the attorney also advises Wife
that now in Virginia she may sue Husband and recover damages for her personal
injuries, provided she waits to sue until after the divorce is final. Wife, who would
otherwise be inclined to seek a reconciliation leading to ultimate preservation of the
marriage, is influenced by the prospect of a damage award and decides to quickly sue
1981] 945
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ated prior policy, stating that existing criminal and divorce remedies were
sufficient and that the availability of an interspousal action would intro-
duce just one more "abrasive and unnecessary ingredient" in the marital
relationship.4 7 Another reason the court expressed for not abrogating the
doctrine was the fear that the court would open itself to a deluge of triv-
ial suits. 8 The court referred to the scenario of the "uninvited kiss"
which, as an assault and battery, would be the basis of recovery by an
overkissed husband or wife .
4
The dissent stated that a tort action should be allowed where, as here,
"a spouse has been injured by a tort committed by the other spouse with
intent to kill, maim, disfigure, or disable and divorce follows the tort
without intervening condonation ... ."5 The dissent did not advocate
an interspousal right of action for every intentional tort, but he felt that
malicious, intentional conduct should be considered an immediate "repu-
diation of the marital contract" since the victim of such a tort would typi-
cally end the marital relationship regardless of the existence of a right of
action. 51
As noted in the dissent, by 1980 the Virginia Supreme Court had
progressed in its rejection of the common law justification of immunity by
recognizing that the fiction of husband and wife as "one flesh" was out-
moded.2 Nevertheless, the court in Counts clung to the illusion of inter-
spousal immunity as the preserver of family harmony. The Counts deci-
sion was a clear indication of the Supreme Court's unwillingness to make
any further exceptions to the doctrine. If further exceptions were to be
made, the change would have to be instituted by the General Assembly.
for divorce so it can become final before the statute of limitations runs on the per-
sonal injury claim.
Id. at 155-56, 266 S.E.2d at 897-98.
47. Id. at 156, 266 S.E.2d at 898. The court stated that a tort remedy would create a
threat such as, "I will not only report your abuse to the criminal prosecutor and seek
spousal support in the course of divorcing you but I will also sue you for damages." Id.
48. See, e.g., Corren v. Corren, 47 So. 2d 774 (Fla. 1950) (allowing suits for insignificant
spousal disputes would destroy family harmony); Drake v. Drake, 145 Minn. 388, 177 N.W.
624 (1920) (husband could enjoin wife's nagging).
49. 221 Va. at 156 n.4, 266 S.E.2d at 898 n.4 (citing Furey v. Furey, 193 Va. 727, 733 n.5,
71 S.E.2d 191, 194 n.5 (1952)).
50. 221 Va. at 157, 266 S.E.2d at 898-99 (Poff, J., dissenting).
51. Id. at 157, 266 S.E.2d at 898 (Poff, J., dissenting).
52. 221 Va. at 157, 266 S.E.2d at 898 (Poff, J., dissenting) (citing Korman v. Carpenter,
216 Va. 86, 90, 216 S.E.2d 195, 197 (1975)).
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V. THE LEGISLATIVE ABOLITION OF INTERSPOUSAL IMMUNITY
The doctrine of interspousal immunity which the Virginia legislature
abolished in its 1981 session was far from the powerful monolith it had
been at common law. The sharp trend across the United States toward
abolition of the doctrine had already weakened its validity as a defense.
Before the General Assembly took its action twenty-five states had totally
abrogated the doctrine.53 Other states had made exceptions to immunity
with respect to motor vehicle negligence cases," wrongful death actions,55
and intentional tort cases.56 Several state legislatures had reacted to judi-
cial decisions and had passed acts addressing the defense of interspousal
immunity. Both the North Carolina and Wisconsin legislatures autho-
rized interspousal suits by both spouses, overruling case law interpreting
the Married Women's Acts as authorizing suits by wives against husbands
but not by husbands against wives. 57 The New York legislature super-
seded a case disallowing tort suits between spouses by passing legislation
which granted either spouse a right of action against the other for tor-
tious injury to person or property.58
In considering the proposed bill to abolish interspousal immunity as a
defense, the Virginia General Assembly confronted a doctrine whose effi-
cacy as a legal principle and utility as an instrument of justice had been
questioned by courts and legislatures. The common law foundation for
interspousal immunity has been thoroughly eroded. The only rationale
which sustained the doctrine was the policy justification for immunity as
53. These states include: Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connpcticut,
Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New
Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Carolina,
South Dakota, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. See generally Annot., 92 A.L.R.
3d 901 (1979).
54. MacDonald v. MacDonald, 412 A.2d 71 (Me. 1980); Lewis v. Lewis, 370 Mass. 619, 351
N.E.2d 526 (1976); Ruper v. Stienne, 90 Nev. 397, 528 P.2d 1013 (1974); Digby v. Digby, -
R.I. -, 388 A.2d 1 (1978); Richard v. Richard, 131 Vt. 98, 300 A.2d 637 (1973).
55. Shiver v. Session, 80 So. 2d 905 (Fla. 1955); Welch v. Davis, 410 Ill. 130, 101 N.E.2d
547 (1951); Deposit Guaranty Bank & Trust Co. v. Nelson, 212 Miss. 335, 54 So. 2d 476
(1951); Kaczorowski v. Kalkosinski, 321 Pa. 438, 184 A. 663 (1936); Asplin v. Anica Mut.
Ins. Co., - R.I. -, 394 A.2d 1353 (1978); Hull v. Silver, 577 P.2d 103 (Utah 1978).
56. Windauer v. O'Connor, 107 Ariz. 267, 485 P.2d 1157 (1971); Lusby v. Lusby, 283 Md.
334, 390 A.2d 77 (1978); Apitz v. Dames, 205 Or. 242, 287 P.2d 585 (1955); Bounds v. Cau-
die, 560 S.W.2d 925 (Tex. 1977); Taylor v. Patten, 2 Utah 2d 404, 275 P.2d 696 (1954).
57. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 52-5 (Repl. Vol. 1976) and Wis. STAT. ANN. § 246.075 (West 1957)
overruling respectively Scholtens v. Scholtens, 230 N.C. 149, 52 S.E.2d 350 (1949) and Fehr
v. General Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corp., 246 Wis. 228, 16 N.W.2d 787 (1944).
58. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 3-313 (McKinney 1978) superseding Allen v. Allen, 246 N.Y.
571, 159 N.E. 656 (1927). Illinois also disallows interspousal actions. ILL. ANN. STAT. Ch. 68,
§ 1 (Smith-Hurd 1959).
1981]
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a preserver of family harmony. This rationale was advanced by the bill's
opponents.59 The sponsor of the bill, Senator Wiley F. Mitchell, Jr., of-
fered comparative divorce statistics from several states surrounding Vir-
ginia60 indicating that the states which had abolished the doctrine had
lower divorce rates than the states which had retained it.61
What prompted the legislature to abrogate the doctrine is difficult to
ascertain. The comparative divorce statistics may have undermined the
policy justification for immunity as the preserver of family harmony. The
legislators could have been influenced also by the less paternalistic view
that the choice to sue should be that of the parties to the marriage who
can best make decisions as to their own happiness. The court is not an
institution suited to policing marital harmony. The courts claim no in-
sight by which to predict the impact of an interspousal law suit on the
strength of a marriage. Possibly the harmony of a marriage may be jeop-
ardized as much by barring a suit as by allowing it. The courts have per-
mitted spouses to maintain suits in equity and property, and contract ac-
tions against each other.62 Personal injury action need not disrupt
tranquillity any more than these other actions.63
By abolishing the defense of interspousal immunity the legislature has
opened the way not only for suits based on intentional, malicious torts
but also for simple negligence actions between spouses. In these actions
the courts had seen the threat of frivolous or inflated claims of personal
injury between spouses.6 This danger can be met most effectively by de-
fining and delineating marital conduct which cannot be the basis for tort
litigation. Not every tort action which might be maintained if the parties
were strangers should be allowed between spouses.6 5 In some situations,
the existence of the marital relationship might warrant the application of
59. Mitchell, Interspousal Immunity, I LEX CLAUDIA No. 1 (June 1981).
60. A copy of the statistics is available in the University of Richmond Law Review Office.
61. Id.
62. See note 21 supra and accompanying text.
63. See for example, Brown v. Gosser, 262 S.W.2d 480, 484 (Ky. 1953), where a wife
brought suit against her husband for injuries sustained in an automobile accident because of
the alleged negligence of her husband. The court noted that, under the Married Women's
Act, the wife could now sue for conversion, detention of chattels, fraud, trespass to land,
waste, and in actions of ejectment or'unlawful detainer. The court found it difficult to see
how an action for personal injuries would disrupt domestic tranquility more than an action
for damage to property. Thus, the court held that the wife could maintain an action against
her husband.
64. See notes 47 & 48 supra and accompanying text.
65. See Lewis v. Lewis, 351 N.E.2d 526, 532 (Mass. 1976); Bushnell v. Bushnell, 131 A.
432, 433 (Conn. 1925).
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implied consent or assumption of the risk."' There should be a carefully
delineated area of privileged conduct existing because of the mutual obli-
gations created by the marriage, which would curtail frivolous litigation. 7
The court has the power to protect itself by demanding proof that the
injury was the result of a clear breach of some marital privilege.
Another objection often made to eliminating interspousal immunity in
these negligence actions is the risk of fraudulent and collusive actions
against insurance companies. Because of the relationship of the parties
and the usual presence of liability insurance, there is a real threat of
fraud on the insurance carrier in domestic negligence cases. Courts have
expressed confidence that the judicial system is well-equipped to screen
out fraudulent claims."8 The adversary system provides the insurance de-
fense counsel adequate tools to uncover a collusive law suit. In Merenoff
v. Merenoff,89 the Supreme Court of New Jersey suggested that courts
could, if necessary, fashion a higher standard of care to compensate for
the risk of fraud between married parties.70 The New Jersey court also
proposed an altered burden of proof which could be applied commensu-
rate with the dimensions of collusion perceived in the particular action. 1
66. See generally McCurdy, Torts, supra note 8; McCurdy, Personal Injury Torts, supra
note 8.
67. See Beaudette v. Frona, 173 N.W.2d 416, 420 (Minn. 1969) in which the Supreme
Court of Minnesota commented:
There is an intimate sharing of contact within the marriage relationship, both inten-
tional and unintentional, that is uniquely unlike the exposure among strangers. The
risks of intentional contact in marriage are such that one should not recover damages
from the other without... [proof] that the injurious contact was... a gross abuse
of normal privilege.
68. See Coffindaffer v. Coffindaffer, - W. Va. , -, 244 S.E.2d 338, 343 (1978) in which
the Supreme Court of West Virginia commented:
Anyone who has confronted insurance defense counsel in personal injury cases knows
that it is a rare occasion when the false or collusive claim escapes their searching
examination. We do an injustice not only to the intelligence of jurors but to the effi-
cacy of the adversary system, when we express undue concern over the question of
collusive or meritless law suits.
69. 76 N.J. 535, 388 A.2d 951 (1978). The Supreme Court of New Jersey was presented
with the issue of extending their limited abrogation in cases of automobile negligence to
cases of negligence in the home. The husband had cut off the wife's finger while carelessly
handling a hedge clipper.
70. Id. at ., 388 A.2d at 963. The court did not characterize this injury as a result of
simple domestic negligence. The activity in this case was unusually dangerous and carried
with it a great risk of injury if not performed with reasonable care. Since there was no
privilege, consent, or shared risks between the spouses, the defendant spouse could not
avoid liability in tort. The court found only a small risk of a fraudulent scheme and so felt
no need to adopt a higher standard of care or an altered burden of proof.
71. Id.
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The fear that trivial or fraudulent claims for personal injury will be
brought by married persons is best countered by the realization that such
claims will not be recognized by the courts or rewarded by juries.
VI. CONCLUSION
In abolishing interspousal immunity the legislature upheld the funda-
mental principle of providing redress for wrongful injury. The common
law doctrine and its modern justifications had stood as an outdated and
inequitable exception to the general tort principle of giving reparation for
injury. The recognition of the right of an injured spouse to seek remedy
against the offending spouse constitutes legislative neutrality toward mar-
ried persons. By eliminating the defense of interspousal immunity, the
Virginia General Assembly removed the judiciary from its role as arbi-
trers of marital harmony, leaving spouses as the guardians of their own
well-being. The right to bring a lawsuit for compensation is the decision
of the individual and should not be denied solely because of marital
status.
Lisa Anderson-Lloyd
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